In the spring of 1912 I moved permanently to Munich.
A German city! What a difference from Vienna! Just thinking about what that racial Babylon was like made me sick. In Munich, the way they spoke was very similar to my own and reminded me of my youth, especially when talking to people from Lower Bavaria.
There were, then, a thousand things that were or became dear to me and appreciated. But what captivated me most was the wonderful connection of native power with the city’s refined artistic atmosphere—that which can be observed in the unique perspective offered from the Hofbräuhaus to the Odeon, from the Oktoberfest meadow to the Pinakothek, and so on. And if today I have a predilection for Munich like no other place in the world, it is undoubtedly because that city is inextricably linked to the evolution of my own life.
Aside from my daily work, in Munich I became interested again, above all, in the study of current political events, particularly those related to foreign policy. The latter, viewed through the lens of Germany’s alliance policy with Austria and Italy, which I had considered a complete mistake since my time in Vienna.
In Austria, the only supporters of the idea of an alliance were the Habsburgs and the Austro-Germans.
The Habsburgs, out of cold calculation and necessity, and the Germans there out of good faith and political naiveté; out of good faith, because they believed that the Triple Alliance would render the German Reich itself a great service, helping to guarantee its security and power; out of political naiveté, because not only was their hope unrealizable, but, on the contrary, they actually cooperated in chaining the Reich to an already cadaverous state, which would later drag both countries into the abyss. And it was naiveté, above all, because the Austro-Germans, by virtue of that alliance, were increasingly falling into the process of de-Germanization.
If the history and psychology of nations had been studied more clearly in Germany, it would surely never have been possible to believe that the Quirinal Palace and the Habsburg Court would one day form a common front. Italy would have become a volcano before any of its governments dared to mobilize—except as an adversary—even a single Italian in favor of the fanatically hated Habsburg state. More than once, in Vienna itself, I witnessed the passionate contempt and profound hatred with which Italians were “tied” to the Austrian state. Too great to forget—even if one had wanted to—was the sin that the House of Habsburg had committed over the centuries, attacking Italian freedom and independence. The will to forget this did not exist in either the mind of the people or the government.
Therefore, for Italy, there were only two options for coexistence with Austria: either alliance or war. By choosing the former, Italy could calmly prepare for the latter.
Germany’s alliance policy was seen as absurd and dangerous, especially as relations between Russia and Austria grew ever closer to the possibility of a military conflict.
What was ultimately the reason for entering into an alliance with Austria? Certainly, it was none other than to safeguard the future of the German Empire under conditions different from what it would have been had it been alone. But that future of the Reich could be none other than maintaining the German people’s survival.
The problem, therefore, was reduced to the following: How to condition the life of the German nation towards a feasible future and how to give that process the indispensable foundations and the necessary security within the framework of the general relations of European power?
Having clearly analyzed the conditions inherent to German foreign policy activity, one had to arrive at this conclusion: Germany has an annual population increase that amounts to, more or less,
900,000 souls, so that the difficulty of providing for the subsistence of this army of new subjects must be greater year after year, and will one day end catastrophically if the means of preventing the danger of famine are not found in time.
There were four paths to choose from to counteract a development with such disastrous consequences: 1. Following the example of France, one could
artificially restrict birth rates and thus avoid overpopulation.
Nature itself often opposes population growth in certain countries or certain races, especially in times of famine or unfavorable climatic conditions, as well as in cases of poor soil fertility. Nature certainly acts wisely and ruthlessly; it does not necessarily nullify the capacity for procreation, but it does oppose the preservation of offspring by subjecting them to rigorous trials and such arduous privations that anyone who is not strong and healthy returns to the bosom of the unknown. Anyone who survives despite the rigors of the struggle for existence is then a thousand times more experienced, strong, and capable of continuing to generate, so that the selection process can begin anew. The decrease in numbers thus implies the strengthening of the individual and, ultimately, the consolidation of the race.
Another thing is that man himself insists on restricting his offspring and causes, instead of the struggle for life – which only leaves the strongest and healthiest standing – there to arise, as a logical consequence, the urge to “save” at all costs the weak and even the sick, cementing the germ of a progeny that will progressively degenerate, as long as this mockery of nature and its laws persists.
This means that anyone who believes they can ensure the existence of the German people through voluntary birth control automatically deprives them of their future.
2. A second path was the one we still hear proposed and praised all too often today: inland colonization. This is a well-intentioned idea held by many, but at the same time misinterpreted by most and capable of causing the greatest imaginable damage.
Undoubtedly, the productivity of a given soil is susceptible to being increased up to a certain limit, but not more than up to a certain limit and by no means indefinitely.
It would then follow that, for a more or less long period, the growth in the German population could be offset by an intensification of agricultural cultivation and the resulting improvement in the yield of our soil; however, this possibility is challenged by the fact that the necessities of life generally increase faster than the population itself. Man’s demands for food and clothing increase year by year, and it is not possible
draw a parallel with what, for example, the needs of our ancestors were a hundred years ago. It is therefore erroneous to assume that every increase in production implies population growth.
Nature knows no political boundaries; it places new beings on the globe and contemplates the free play of the forces acting upon them. To those who then rise through their drive and character, it grants the supreme right to existence.
A people that is limited to the plan of “internal” colonization, while other races embrace ever-increasing territorial expanses across the globe, will be forced to resort to voluntary restriction of its birth rate, precisely at a time when other peoples continue to multiply permanently. Since, in general, the most capable nations, or rather the only ones that represent races of cultural worth and that are the conductors of all human progress, in their pacifist hallucination, renounce the acquisition of new territories, sufficing with their “internal colonization,” while other nations of a lower level know how to secure power over enormous colonial domains, one would have to reach the logical conclusion that the world will one day be dominated by that culturally backward portion of humanity, but capable of greater force of action.
It cannot be emphasized enough that all internal German colonization is primarily intended only to correct social anomalies and prevent the land from becoming the object of general speculation.
With the above mentioned, there are still two ways to guarantee bread and work for the ever-increasing German population that remain to be mentioned.
3. New territories could be acquired to house the annual surplus of millions of inhabitants and thus maintain the nation on the basis of its own subsistence.
4. Or decide to make our industry and trade produce for foreign consumption, giving us the possibility of living off the resulting profits.
There was no choice left, then, but between territorial policy or colonial and commercial policy.
These two possibilities were considered, studied, advocated, and also opposed from a variety of perspectives until the latter was finally chosen.
Certainly the most convenient of the two would have been the first.
The acquisition of new colonizable territories for our surplus population offers countless advantages, especially if we consider the future and not the present.
Undoubtedly, such a territorial policy on the part of Germany cannot fulfill its purpose in Cameroon, for example, but it is possible, and nowadays almost exclusively, in Europe.
Many European states today resemble an inverted pyramid. Their territorial area in Europe is simply ridiculously small in relation to their colonial dominions, foreign trade, etc. It could well be said: the apex is in Europe and the base is in the entire world, unlike the United States of America, whose base lies within its own continent, not touching the rest of the world, but through its apex. This is where the enormous potential of this nation stems, and, in Europe, the limited vitality of many European countries with vast colonial dominions.
The case of England itself does not prove otherwise, for when considering the British Empire, it is easy to forget the existence of the Anglo-Saxon world. Of course, England’s situation, simply because of its shared culture and language with the United States of America, cannot be compared with that of any other European country.
Consequently, the only possibility for Germany to pursue a sound territorial policy lies in the acquisition of new lands on the continent itself. Colonies cannot serve this purpose unless they are suitable for large-scale settlement by Europeans. In the 19th century, it was no longer possible to acquire areas suitable for colonization by peaceful means. Such a colonial policy would therefore only have been feasible through a tenacious struggle, which would actually have been more profitable if it had been applied to acquiring territories on the continent itself rather than in overseas countries.
And if that acquisition was to be made in Europe, it could only be at the expense of Russia.
Incidentally, for a policy of that tendency, there was only one possible ally in Europe: England.
Only with the support of this country could the new crusade of Germanism have begun. The right, to be invoked in
In this case, it would have been no less justified than that of our ancestors.
To gain English acquiescence, no sacrifice could have been too great. The point would have been to renounce colonial possessions and the aspiration for maritime power, thus sparing British industry from the competitive struggle.
Only a fixed and clear orientation could have led to this result: renouncing world trade and colonies; renouncing the maintenance of a German navy and instead concentrating the state’s entire military potential in the army. Naturally, the immediate consequence might have been a temporary limitation, but it would have guaranteed a great and powerful future.
There was a time when England would have been willing to address the issue, since she fully understood that Germany, in view of the ever-increasing growth of her population, would be forced to seek a solution to her problem and find it, either with England in Europe or without England in the world.
It was certainly under this impression that London attempted a rapprochement with Germany at the end of the last century. For the first time, what we have been able to observe in recent years in Germany became evident in a truly alarming way: There was a feeling of reluctance at the very idea of having to take England to task, as if an alliance based on anything other than mutual convenience had ever occurred. And with England, it was not difficult to reach such a negotiation. English diplomacy was always intelligent enough not to ignore the fact that every concession implies reciprocity.
Imagine for a moment the enormous significance for Germany if a skillful German foreign policy had adopted the “role” that Japan assigned itself in 1904.
A “world war” would never have occurred. But that path was clearly not chosen.
Only the fourth possibility remained: global industry and trade – maritime power and colonial domination.
If a European territorial policy was only feasible against Russia, with England as an ally, conversely, a colonial policy of expansion and world trade was only conceivable against England, with Russia’s support. However, in such a case, the following would have to be assumed:
consequences without any consideration and, above all, to disengage from Austria as soon as possible.
Considered from every point of view, the alliance with Austria was, for Germany, already at the end of the last century, an unspeakable folly.
But there was no thought of allying with Russia against England, much less with England against Russia, since both scenarios would ultimately have meant war. And precisely to avoid it, the decision was made to opt for a policy of commerce and industry. In the pursuit of the “peaceful-economic conquest” of the world, it was believed that they had the recipe to once and for all put an end to the policy of violence employed until then. It is likely that at times people were not so sure of the path chosen, especially when inexplicable threats occasionally came from England. This was the reason why Germany decided to build a war fleet, not intended to attack or destroy British power, but simply to “defend” the aforementioned “universal peace” and the “peaceful” conquest of the world.
Hence, this fleet was created on a scale that was in every sense more modest than that of England, not only in the number of units, but also in terms of their movement and armament, revealing here also the truly “peaceful” intention that was harbored.
The theme of the “peaceful-economic conquest” of the world was undoubtedly the greatest absurdity enshrined as the guiding principle of state policy. Such a contradiction was made even more notable by the fact that England was not hesitant to be taken as a reference for the possibility of carrying out such a conquest. The damage that our highly academic conception of history and its routine teaching contributed to can never be repaired and constitutes incontrovertible proof that countless people “learn” history without understanding it, much less being able to interpret it.
The clear refutation of that theory must have been seen in England’s politics; for no other country knew how to prepare its economic conquests better or more brutally than England, using the sword, and then resolutely defending them. Is it not a typical characteristic of British statecraft to extract economic benefits from its political power?
Vice versa: to transform without delay any new economic conquest into political power? And what a mistake it is to suppose that England itself was perhaps too cowardly to risk its own blood in support of its economic policy. The fact that the English nation lacked an army constituted by the people in no way proved the contrary; for the situation in this regard does not depend on the form of the armed institution itself, but rather, above all, on the determination and will with which it is put into action at the given moment. England always counted on the military supplies indispensable to its needs and always fought with those weapons that success demanded. It used mercenaries, as long as mercenaries sufficed, and it also resolutely appealed to the support of the blood of the best members of the nation when such sacrifice was the only means left to ensure victory. But its determination to fight, along with its tenacity and inflexible leadership, always remained unchanged.
I clearly remember the great astonishment that was reflected in the faces of my comrades when, in Flanders, we first came face to face with the “Tommies.” After the first battles, each of us was able to convince ourselves that those Scots had nothing in common with those others so kindly portrayed in our humorous sheets and press reports.
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It was enough to consider the folly of this policy of “peaceful-economic” conquest of the world to realize, equally clearly, the absurdity of the Triple Alliance.
The value of the Triple Alliance was already psychologically insignificant, because the consistency of an alliance tends to diminish in proportion to its mere maintenance of an existing state of affairs; while in the opposite case, an alliance will be stronger the greater the expectation of the contracting parties to achieve tangible and expansive goals through that alliance. Here, as in everything, strength lies not in defensive action but in attack.
It was fortunate for Germany that the war of 1914 came indirectly from the Austrian side, so that the Habsburgs
They were thus forced to take part in it; if the opposite had happened, Germany would have been left alone.
Very few at that time could have realized the magnitude of the dangers and difficulties that the alliance with the Danube Monarchy brought with it.
First of all, Austria had too many enemies eager to inherit the spoils of that decrepit state, and it was no surprise that over time a certain hatred had developed against Germany, considering it the obstacle to the long-awaited and desired ruin of the Austrian monarchy. The conclusion had been reached that Vienna could only be reached by way of Berlin.
Secondly, thanks to this policy, Germany lost the best and most promising opportunities for forming other alliances. Instead, a situation of growing tension arose with Russia and even with Italy itself; however, in Rome, general opinion was favorable to Germany, while in the hearts of the last Italians, a hostile feeling toward Austria fermented—and often boiled over—in the midst of the war.
Finally, thirdly, this alliance must have fundamentally entailed a grave danger for Germany, given the fact that any European power truly opposed to Bismarck’s Reich could at any time easily mobilize a number of states against Germany, offering them material advantages at the expense of Austria’s allies. All the countries of Eastern Europe were predisposed against the Danube Monarchy, but Italy and Russia were particularly so.
Even in the few small circles I frequented in Munich, I never hid my conviction that this unhappy alliance with a state fatally destined for ruin would also lead to catastrophic disaster for Germany, if it did not know how to disengage itself from the former in time.
Nor did I doubt for a moment my firm persuasion when the outbreak of the world war seemed to have annulled all reflection and when the delirium of civic enthusiasm absorbed even those official strata for whom there could have been nothing but a cold calculation of reality. Even finding myself in the line of fire, I always maintained my opinion, whenever the problem was discussed, that the Austro-German alliance should
be dissolved (and the sooner it was, the better for Germany) and also that as a tribute to this, the Habsburg monarchy would not mean any sacrifice compared to the possibility of thereby obtaining a decrease in the number of the adversaries of the German nation; for it was not to defend a corrupt dynasty, but to save the German nation, that millions of men wore the steel helmet.
On several occasions before the war, there was a sense that, in at least one political sector in Germany, there was some doubt about the appropriateness of the alliance policy pursued by the government. From time to time, conservative circles in Germany voiced their warning against the prevailing overconfidence, but this, like all reasonable measures, must have fallen on deaf ears.
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With the triumphant advance of German technology and industry, and with the growing development of trade, the notion that all this was only possible under the aegis of a powerful state increasingly disappeared. On the contrary, the conviction had even been held in many circles that the state itself owed its existence to these manifestations and that it represented, first and foremost, an economic institution governed according to economic principles and, therefore, also dependent on the economy as a whole; in short, a state of affairs that was hailed as the best and most natural in the world.
The State has nothing to do with a specific economic criterion or a process of economic development. Nor does it constitute a gathering of financial and economic managers in a field of activity with defined limits aimed at the fulfillment of economic tasks. Rather, it is the organization of a community of morally and physically homogeneous beings, with the aim of improving the conditions for the preservation of their race and thus fulfilling the mission assigned to it by Providence. This, and nothing else, constitutes the purpose and reason for the existence of a State.
The Jewish State was never limited by material borders; its boundaries encompass the universe, but they concern a single race. That is why the Jewish people have always formed a State within a State.
One of the most ingenious devices ever devised is to make this State appear as a “religion” and thus ensure the tolerance that the Aryan element is always willing to grant to a religious dogma. In reality, the religion of Moses is nothing more than a doctrine for the preservation of the Jewish race. Hence, it encompasses almost all branches of human knowledge appropriate to its objective, be they sociological, political, or economic.
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Whenever Germany’s political power experienced an upward shift, the economic situation also improved; but when economic activity became the sole focus of national life, stifling idealistic virtues, the state collapsed, dragging the economy down with it.
If one were to ask what the forces that truly create, or at least sustain, a state really are, one could, in summary, formulate the following concept: the individual’s spirit and willingness to sacrifice for the community. That these virtues have nothing in common with economics stems from the simple consideration that man never goes so far as to sacrifice himself for the latter; that is, he doesn’t die for business, but rather for ideals.
The prevailing prewar belief that the German people could monopolize the world market or even conquer the world through peaceful means was a classic sign of the disappearance of the truly shaping and sustaining virtues of the state, as well as the resulting virtues: discernment, willpower, and a spirit of action. The corollary of such a state of affairs must have been the world war and its consequences.
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Meditating countless times on all these problems that were revealed to me through my way of thinking with respect to the German alliance policy and the economic policy of the Reich in the years 1912 to 1914,
I can realize more and more clearly that the key to everything was in that power that I had already known in Vienna, but from very different starting points than today: Marxist doctrine and ideology, as well as the influence of its organized action.
For the second time in my life, I had to immerse myself in the study of this devastating doctrine, but this time I dedicated my attention to the goal of conquering this global scourge. I studied the meaning, action, and success of Bismarck’s emergency laws, just as I once again subjected the relationship between Marxism and Judaism to rigorous examination.
In various circles, some of which today loyally support the National Socialist cause, I began, in the years 1913 and 1914, to express my conviction that the fundamental problem for Germany’s future lay in the destruction of Marxism. The unfortunate German policy of alliances revealed itself to me as one of the many consequences stemming from the dissociative work of this doctrine. The horrifying thing was precisely the fact that the Marxist poison was almost imperceptibly undermining all the basic principles of a healthy conception of the State and the national economy, without those affected even realizing in the slightest the extreme degree to which their conduct already reflected that ideology, which was usually so vigorously contested. Treatments were also sometimes attempted against the prevailing endemic disease, but almost always the symptoms were confused with the cause itself. Since the latter was either unknown or not wanted to be known, the fight against Marxism acted like therapy on a charlatan.
