CHAPTER FOURTEEN Political Orientation to the East
Two reasons lead me to analyze in a special way the relations between Germany and Russia: firstly, because it is perhaps the most important question in all of German foreign policy, and secondly, because it constitutes the touchstone that gives the measure of the political capacity of clear-sighted thinking and the correct way of acting of the young National Socialist movement.
In general terms, I will make the following consideration: The foreign policy of the racist State must ensure the race that encompasses that State, the means of subsistence on this planet, establishing a natural, vital and healthy relationship between the density and increase of the population, on the one hand, and the extension and quality of the land on which it lives, on the other.
Only a sufficiently large territory can guarantee a people the freedom of their life. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that, in addition to the significance of a state’s territory as a direct source of subsistence, it must also have a political-military importance. Even when a people’s subsistence is assured thanks to the land it possesses, it will still be necessary to consider ways to guarantee the security of this land; this security resides in the general political power of a state, which, in turn, depends largely on the country’s geographic-military position.
Under such circumstances, only as a world power can the German people defend its future. For almost two thousand years, the defense of the interests of our people, which is what we should properly call our more or less successful foreign policy activity, has been universal history. We ourselves have witnessed this: for the gigantic conflagration of nations from 1914 to 1918—called the World War—was nothing other than the struggle of the German people for its existence on earth.
The German people entered that war as a pseudo-world power, and I say pseudo because, in reality, it wasn’t a power. If the relationship between the size of its territory and the density of its population had been different in Germany in 1914, the German nation could have effectively considered itself a world power, and the war, regardless of countless other factors, might have ended favorably.
Germany is not, at present, a world power. Even if our current military importance were to be surpassed one day, we would no longer have the right to claim that title.
Considering the question from a purely territorial point of view, Germany’s area appears insignificant compared to that of the so-called world powers. Let us not take the case of England as proof to the contrary, for the territory of the mother country in Europe is, in truth, nothing more than the great capital of the global British Empire, which covers almost a quarter of the globe.
We must then consider, in order of magnitude, the gigantic nations of the United States: the North American Union, Russia, and China; all of them with territorial constituencies ten times larger than the area of the current Reich. France itself should be counted among these states. Not only is its army increasingly swelled by elements from the Black reserves that populate its vast colonies, but the Negroid bastardization of its race is also progressing so rapidly that one can almost speak of the genesis of an African state on European soil. France’s colonial policy cannot be compared with that of the old Germany. If this revolution in France were to continue for three centuries, every last remnant of Frankish blood would be wiped out, absorbed by a European-African mulatto state in the making.
The old German colonial policy neither increased the area of the German population nor made the criminal attempt to reinforce the power of the Reich with the contribution of black blood. The military organization of the Askars in German East Africa was in reality intended only for the defense of the colony itself. Never—even disregarding the fact that, during the world conflagration, it was practically impossible—did Germany ever entertain the idea of bringing black troops to a European theater of war, nor would it have thought of doing so under more difficult conditions.
favorable, while the French always considered this idea as one of the determining reasons for their colonial activity.
Today, we see a series of powers that significantly surpass Germany’s might, not only in terms of population but, above all, in terms of their political power based on their territorial dominance.
We are out of competition with the great states of the world, and this is due to the fatal orientation of our people’s foreign policy.
The National Socialist movement must set itself the mission of remedying the disproportion between the density of our population and the size of our land area—a land area that must be considered from the dual perspective of a source of subsistence and a support for political power—and also of eliminating the disproportion that reigns between our great historical past and the sad prospect of our impotence in the present.
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The potential of a nation cannot be assessed in itself, but only through comparison with other states. But it is precisely this comparison that demonstrates that the growth of the power of other nations was not only more regular, but also, in its final effect, achieved much more considerable results than in Germany.
Considering that, in terms of heroic spirit, no people has surpassed ours, which is surely the one that, on the whole, made the greatest sacrifices of blood in the struggle for its existence, it must be admitted that the failure of its efforts can only be attributed to the erroneous form of its application.
If, in connection with this background, we examine the political events of our people during the last thousand years, we recall the numerous wars and struggles for freedom and, finally, we analyze the result of all this history, we will have to confess that from this sea of blood, only three culminating realities emerged, which well deserve to be considered as the lasting fruits of perfectly balanced events.
defined by foreign policy and German policy in general: I) The colonization of the Eastern Mark carried out mainly by the Bayuwares.
II) The conquest and penetration of the territory east of the Elbe.
The third momentous event in our political activity was the formation of the State of Prussia and, with it, the systematic promotion of a special political concept and the instinct for self-preservation and defense of the German army, based on organization and in accordance with the needs of the time. It was precisely thanks to the discipline of the Prussian military establishment that the German people—dissociated and super-individualized by the diversity of its components—was able to regain at least part of its almost lost capacity for organization.
It is worth emphasizing that the importance of the truly remarkable political successes our people have achieved in their millennia-long struggles is understood and appreciated far better by our adversaries than by ourselves. For our present and future actions, it is of utmost importance to distinguish between the effective political successes of our people and the national blood sacrificed in vain.
We National Socialists must never associate ourselves with the current patriotism of our current bourgeois world. Above all, it poses a grave danger to consider ourselves linked, even in the slightest, to the final stage of pre-war development. The only conclusion we must draw from the past is to orient our political action in two directions: land as the objective of our foreign policy and a new, ideologically consolidated, unified foundation as the goal of domestic policy.
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The attempt to restore the 1914 borders constitutes a political folly of such proportions and consequences that it is revealed as a crime, and this, without even considering the fact that the borders of the Reich at that time could have been anything but logical.
Indeed, they were neither perfect in terms of encompassing the entire territory inhabited by elements of German nationality, nor even less reasonable from the point of view of their strategic-military convenience.
They were not, therefore, the result of a well-thought-out policy action, but simply provisional borders established in the course of a completely unfinished evolution, or, if you will, borders resulting in part from pure chance.
This claim fully corresponds to the criteria of our bourgeois world, which, in this regard, also lacks a single idea of political orientation for the future, but rather lives in the past, that is, in the most immediate future. It is therefore understandable that the political vision of these people does not go beyond 1914. By proclaiming the vindication of those borders as the objective of their policy, they do nothing but foster the decadent solidarity of our adversaries, and only thus can we explain why, eight years after a war in which states of the most heterogeneous views took part, the coalition of the then victors can still hold, more or less firmly.
All these states profited from the German disaster. Fear of our power relegated the ambition and envy of the great powers toward the background. They saw in a common distribution, as far as possible, of the inheritances of our Reich the best guarantee against a future German uprising. The unease of conscience and the fear they feel in the face of the vitality of our people constitute the most lasting cement that, even today, maintains the cohesion of the members of this coalition. Only childish minds can indulge in the idea that a reconsideration of the Versailles decree is feasible through entreaties or tricks, apart from the fact that such an attempt would involve the intervention of a Talleyrand we do not possess.
Moreover, times have changed since the Congress of Vienna: it is no longer princes and their “maîtresses” who haggle over borders today: it is the inexorable cosmopolitan Jew who now fights to impose his hegemony over the people.
The borders of 1914 have no value for the future of the German nation. They were no guarantee in the past, nor would they constitute a strength for the future. On their basis, the German people will not be able to regain its internal unity, much less secure its subsistence; beyond this, those borders, considered from a military point of view, do not appear convenient or even satisfactory, and they would ultimately fail to improve our current situation vis-à-vis the other powers, that is, the true powers.
world. England’s lead over us would not diminish, nor would we reach the potential of the United States, nor would France’s political importance in the world suffer any significant decline.
Only one thing would be clear: The attempt to restore the 1914 borders would lead—even if successful—to such a depletion of our people that, at the precise moment of adopting resolutions and carrying out actions that would truly ensure the life and future of the nation, no valuable reserves would be available. On the contrary, in the intoxication of a superficial success, all further goals would be abandoned in favor of the satisfaction of having restored national honor and opened some doors to commercial development, at least for a time.
In the face of all this, we National Socialists must unwaveringly uphold our foreign policy objective, which is to secure for the German people their rightful place in the world. And this is the only action that before God and our German posterity can justify a blood sacrifice; before God, because we have been placed on earth with the mission of the eternal struggle for our daily bread; before our posterity, because not the blood of a single citizen will be shed without this sacrifice meaning the lives of a thousand other citizens of the future Germany.
No people on earth possesses even a single square meter of land by virtue of a higher will or right. The borders of states are created by men, and it is they themselves who modify them. The fact that a people seize an excessive amount of territory does not imply perpetual recognition of it. This, at most, highlights the strength of the conquerors and the impotence of the conquered. And only in this strength lies the right of possession. Just as our ancestors did not receive the land on which we live as a gift from heaven, but rather won it at the risk of their lives, so it will not be by gracious concession that our people will obtain, in the future, the land and with it, the security of their
subsistence; but only by the work of a victorious sword.
Although we also recognize the need to reach an agreement with France, it would be futile, in principle, if the objective of our foreign policy were to be fulfilled by such an agreement. It will only have its justification if it offers support for the expansion of the French economy.
territorial unity of the German nation in Europe. For the solution to this problem is not to be found in the possession of colonial dominions, but exclusively in the acquisition of a territorial area that increases the size of the mother country, thus providing the new settlers not only with the possibility of maintaining a close community with this country of origin, but also ensuring for the whole the advantages resulting from territorial fusion.
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We, the National Socialists, have deliberately put an end to the pre-war orientation of German foreign policy. We will now begin where this policy left off six centuries ago. We will halt the eternal German exodus to southern and western Europe and turn our attention to the lands of the East. We will finally close the era of pre-war colonial and commercial policy and move on to guiding German territorial policy for the future.
Fate itself seems to want to show us the course of events. Having abandoned Russia to Bolshevism, it deprived the Russian people of that thinking class that, until then, had created and guaranteed its existence as a state. More than once, inferior peoples, guided by sovereigns and organizers of Germanic origin, came to constitute powerful nations that survived as long as the governing racial nucleus could be preserved. For centuries, Russia had been sustained by the Germanic nucleus of its higher spheres, a nucleus which can be said to have been completely exterminated today. In its place, the Jew has taken its place; but just as it is impossible for the Russian people to shake off the Israelite yoke on their own, it is no less impossible for the Jews to succeed, in the long run, in maintaining the gigantic Russian organism under their power. The Jew himself is not an element of organization, but a ferment of decomposition. The colossus of the East is ripe for collapse. And the end of Jewish domination in Russia will, at the same time, be the end of Russia as a state. We are destined to witness a catastrophe that will constitute the most formidable test of the truth of our racist theory.
Our mission – the mission of the National Socialist movement – must be to lead our people to the political persecution from which they should not expect
see his future goal fulfilled in the delirium of a new triumphant campaign by Alexander, but rather in the laborious work of the German plough, to which the sword has only to provide the soil.
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It is only natural that Jewry should put up a tenacious resistance to such a German policy. Jews understand better than anyone the significance of this approach for their future. And it is precisely this fact that should lead people of true national sentiment toward a new direction. But unfortunately, there are also nationalist and even “national-racist” circles that openly oppose the idea of such a policy oriented toward the East, invoking in its support the well-known reference to a hallowed figure from our history. Bismarck is cited to justify a policy that is absurd and at the same time detrimental to the interests of the German people.
It is stated that: Bismarck always placed importance on maintaining good relations with Russia. Indeed, this was the case, but only conditionally, since Bismarck would never have dreamed of establishing, in principle, the tactics of a particular political course.
Consequently, the question should not be: What did Bismarck want? But rather: What would Bismarck do under the current circumstances? This question is precisely the easiest to answer. Guided by his political skill, he would never have entered into an alliance with a state destined for ruin.
Furthermore, Bismarck, in his time, viewed German colonial and commercial policy with suspicion, because, for the time being, he was only concerned with the surest way to facilitate the consolidation of the Empire he had created. This was also the only reason he welcomed the existence of Russian support, which allowed him to operate freely toward the West. But what was beneficial to Germany then would be detrimental to it today.
Already in the years 1920-1921, when the young National Socialist movement was slowly beginning to emerge on the political horizon, and when it was already being hailed here and there as the libertarian movement of the German nation, attempts were made, from different quarters, to establish a certain connection between it and the libertarian currents of other
countries. This responded to the orientation of the “League of Oppressed Nations,” propagated by many. These were primarily representatives of some Balkan states, and then Egypt and India, who always gave me the impression of pretentious charlatans, devoid of any real basis. And quite a few Germans, particularly in nationalist circles, were seduced by such fatuous Orientals, believing they saw, without further ado, in any simple Hindu or Egyptian student a “representative” of India or Egypt. These people could never understand that, in most cases, they were dealing with individuals without solvency and, above all, not authorized by anyone to enter into any agreement with anyone, so that the practical result of maintaining relations with such subjects could only be null.
It was already serious enough that the Reich’s alliance policy in the pre-war era had ended—due to the lack of a specific purpose for offensive action—by constituting a “defensive partnership” with veteran states long relegated by world history. Neither the alliance with Austria nor the one agreed upon with Turkey had much to offer. While the world’s greatest military and industrial powers were associating around an active plan of aggression, we were determined to unite a few old and already impotent states to try to confront the action of the global coalition with those ruins. Germany paid dearly for the error of its foreign policy; however, this experience does not seem to have been bitter enough to prevent our eternal illusionists from falling into the same old error. Whether it is a league of oppressed peoples, a league of nations, or some other new chimerical intervention, thousands of credulous spirits will always be found, despite everything.
I still remember the childish and no less incomprehensible expectations that suddenly arose in national-racist circles around 1920-1921; it was said that England was on the brink of catastrophe in India. A few Asian puppeteers, or, if you will, true “champions of Hindu freedom,” who were then swarming in Europe, had managed to convince even sensible people of the absurd idea that the British Empire was indeed facing imminent ruin in India, which is the hinge—so to speak—of its colonial power.
It is truly childish to suppose that England failed to appreciate India’s significance for British global unity. It only demonstrates that England has learned nothing from the lessons of the war, much less has it come to understand and recognize Anglo-Saxon fortitude, to imagine that England could resign itself to losing India without first risking everything. Moreover, it is proof of the Germans’ complete ignorance of how the English know how to penetrate and administer this vast dominion.
England would lose India only when, in its administrative mechanism, it itself became a victim of a process of racial decomposition (an eventuality that for India remains beyond discussion for the moment) or if it were defeated by a powerful enemy.
But the Hindu agitators will never succeed. We know from our own experience how difficult it is to subdue England! Even so, as a German, I would always prefer, despite everything, to see India under English domination than under any other.
No less insignificant are the hopes placed on the mythological uprising of Egypt against England.
As a nationalist who values human worth according to racial principles and recognizes the inferiority of these so-called “oppressed nations,” I certainly cannot identify the fate of my people with that of those countries.
We must maintain exactly the same criterion with regard to Russia. Present-day Russia, stripped of its ruling class of German origin, cannot—apart from what its new sovereigns themselves seek—ever serve as an ally in the German people’s struggle for freedom. From a military point of view, the circumstances would be truly catastrophic in the event of a war between Germany and Russia, in coalition against Western Europe and, probably, against the rest of the world. The fighting would take place on German territory without Germany receiving even the slightest effective assistance from Russia. Moreover, in the event of such a war, Russia would first have to crush Poland in order to be able to bring the first Russian soldier to a German battlefront. But, strictly speaking, it would not be primarily a question of receiving soldiers from a Russian ally, but above all, war material. Russia’s role as a technical factor would be completely null, and what happened in the World War would have to be repeated, in which the
German industry was plundered to serve our glorious allies, so that the technical war had to be waged almost alone by Germany. We could hardly oppose the general motorization of the world, which will characterize the war of the future to an astonishing extent. It is a fact that in this important branch, Germany shows shameful backwardness and that from the little it possesses, it would still have to supply Russia, a country which, even today, does not have a factory of its own capable of producing a proper automobile.
Beyond all this, it must never be forgotten that the international Jew, the absolute sovereign of today’s Russia, does not see in Germany a possible ally, but only a state predestined to the same political fate.
For Bolshevism, Germany constitutes the great immediate objective of its struggle. All the vigor of a new idea, embodying a mission, is required to once again tear our people from the stranglehold of this international serpent and to put an end to the contamination of our blood, so that the nation’s energies, thus liberated, can be dedicated to guaranteeing the security of the German homeland, preventing, even in the most distant future, catastrophes like the recent ones. And if this goal is pursued, it would be madness to ally with a state that claims as its sovereign the mortal enemy of our future.
I frankly confess that, even in the pre-war period, it would have seemed more convenient to me for Germany, renouncing its senseless colonial policy and, consequently, the increase in its merchant and war fleet, to have made a pact with England against Russia and thus move from its trivial cosmopolitan policy to a resolute European policy with a territorial tendency on the continent.
I cannot forget the constant and provocative threat that Pan-Slavic Russia at that time dared to make to Germany; I cannot forget the frequent attempts at mobilization, the purpose of which was none other than to provoke us; nor can I forget the mood of Russian public opinion, which, even before the war, exaggerated its hateful attacks against our people and the Empire, and even less can I forget the attitude of the mainstream press in Russia, which was deliriously devoted to France.
But despite all this, there would have been a second possibility before the war: to try to rely on Russia to confront England. Today, circumstances are different. The process of consolidation in which the great powers are currently engaged is
For us, the final alarm bell is ringing, urging us to react, so that our people can return from their dreams to harsh reality, and show us the only path to the future capable of leading the Reich into an era of new prosperity.
If the National Socialist movement, realizing the magnitude and importance of this mission, rids itself of illusions and allows reason alone to prevail, then it is possible that one day the catastrophe of 1918 will be transformed into an infinite blessing for the future of our people. From disaster, the German nation can emerge from a completely new direction in its foreign policy and then, internally consolidated by a new ideology, achieve a definitive stabilization of international policy. Then Germany will finally be able to possess what England possesses, what Russia itself possessed, and what allowed France to adopt decisions that were always similar and always fundamentally beneficial to the defense of its interests: a political testament.
The political testament of the German nation, for its foreign policy, must logically read as follows: Never tolerate the formation of two continental powers in Europe. Always see the danger of aggression against Germany in any attempt to organize a second military power on German borders, even if only in the form of a state capable of becoming one, and also see in this not only the right but also the duty to prevent by all means, even by resorting to arms, the creation of such a state, and if it already exists, to simply destroy it. Ensure that the potential of our people does not reside in colonial dominions, but in the homeland of the continent itself.
Never consider the Reich secure until it is able to give each new descendant of our people, throughout the centuries, their rightful share.
Finally, never forget that the most sacred of all rights to the earth is the right to the soil that one wishes to cultivate through one’s own efforts, and the most sacred of all sacrifices is the blood shed for that soil.
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In the previous chapter, I pointed to England and Italy as the only two states in Europe toward which Germany’s rapprochement might be desirable and promising. I will now briefly outline the military importance of such an alliance.
The consequences resulting from this pact would be, in every respect, militarily speaking, the diametric opposite of what would be the case in the case of an alliance with Russia. The most important thing is that a rapprochement with England and Italy does not in itself imply the danger of war. France, which would be the only power interested in adopting a position opposed to the pact, would practically be in no position to do so; it would no longer have the initiative to act because it would be in the hands of the new Anglo-German-Italian European League.
But perhaps of greater significance would be the fact that the new coalition would bring together countries with a technical capacity capable of complementing each other to a certain extent.
Surely, the difficulties that oppose the creation of such a league are great; but one might ask whether the formation of the Entente was a less difficult task. What was possible for Edward VII, in part contrary to natural interests, we can also achieve if, convinced of the necessity of such an evolution, we adapt our intelligently conceived approach to it.
Of course, today we are at the mercy of the furious barking of our people’s internal enemies. We National Socialists must never allow ourselves to be prevented from proclaiming what, in accordance with our deepest conviction, is indispensable.
Certainly, at present, we have to go against the tide of public opinion, influenced by Jewish trickery, which knows how to exploit German naiveté. It is also true that, many times, the waves crash terribly against us; but it is known that those who go with the flow will be less noticed than those who throw themselves against it. Today, we are a mere obstacle, but in a few years, fate may turn us into a dike where the general current breaks, allowing it to follow a new course.
