CHAPTERÂ THIRTEEN Germany’s Alliance Policy After the War
The prevailing confusion in the handling of the Reich’s foreign affairs, due to the lack of fundamental guidelines for a suitable alliance policy, not only continued after the war, but even reached worse levels. If before 1914 the primary source of our foreign policy errors could be considered the confusion of political concepts, in the postwar period the cause lay in the absence of a sincere purpose. It was natural that those circles that had achieved their destructive objective with the revolution would have no interest in pursuing an alliance policy that would tend to restore the autonomy of the German state.
As long as the National Socialist German Workers’ Party remained a small and little-known group, foreign policy issues may have seemed of secondary importance to many of our coreligionists. This was due primarily to the fact that our movement held, and always holds, in principle, the conviction that external freedom does not come from heaven, nor is it the result of natural phenomena, but rather, eternally, the fruit of the development of one’s own internal forces. Only the elimination of the causes of the 1918 disaster and the elimination of those who benefited from it can establish the basis of our struggle for freedom.
But as soon as the scope of that small and insignificant circle expanded and the young institution acquired the importance of an association, the need logically arose to define positions on the problems of the Reich’s foreign policy. It was necessary to establish guidelines that not only did not contradict the fundamental concepts of our ideology, but were also an expression of it.
The basic and essential principle that we must always keep in mind when dealing with this issue is that foreign policy is also nothing more than a means to an end, but an end in the service of our own
Nationality. No consideration of foreign policy can be made from any perspective other than the following: Would the proposed action benefit our people, now or in the future, or would it be detrimental?
This is the only preconceived opinion that should be put into play when dealing with this issue. Partisan political, religious, human, and, in general, any other viewpoints are completely out of place.
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If before the war the objective of German foreign policy was to ensure the livelihood of our people and their children, paving the way for this goal and securing the support of suitable allies, today the problem is the same, with only one difference: Before the war, the motto was the preservation of the German national heritage based on the power embodied by the existing state. Now, it is a matter of restoring to the nation, in the form of a free state, the strength it needs as an essential condition for the subsequent implementation of a practical foreign policy aimed at guaranteeing the preservation, development, and livelihood of our people in the future.
In other words: The aim of German foreign policy today must be to regain freedom for tomorrow.
The question of the reintegration of territories lost by a state will always be, first and foremost, a question of restoring the political power and autonomy of the mother country. Therefore, in a given case, the interests of such territories must be relegated without consideration to the sole interest of regaining the freedom of the central territory.
Not by virtue of ardent protests, but by the action of a sword with a forceful blow, the oppressed countries return to the bosom of the common homeland.
Forging this sword is the work of a nation’s domestic government; ensuring that process and seeking allies is the task of foreign policy.
In the first part of this book, I challenged the shortcomings of our pre-war alliance policy. Of the four possibilities at that time,
which tended to the preservation and sustenance of the German people, the last, and the worst, of all had been chosen. Instead of a sound colonial and commercial policy, which was all the more absurd because it was believed that this would avoid armed conflict, an attempt was made simultaneously to take a seat on all the chairs, and the result could only be to fall to the ground between two of them. The outbreak of war was the final testament to the Reich’s erroneous international policy.
The right path at that time would have been the one offered by the third possibility: Continental consolidation of the Reich through the acquisition of new territories in Europe.
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Since no systematic preparations for war were desired, territorial expansion in Europe was abandoned and the possibility of allying with England was sacrificed—instead of dedicating itself to colonial and commercial policy—without, as was logical, seeking the support of Russia, and this is how Germany ended up falling into the world war, abandoned by all but the decadent Habsburg monarchy.
A calm examination of the current conditions of European political power leads to the following conclusion: For three hundred years the history of our continent has been notably influenced by the political aims of England, directed towards securing indirectly, through the relationship of forces of reciprocal compensation, among the European States, the necessary support for the achievement of the great ends of its world policy.
The traditional tendency of British diplomacy, comparable in Germany only to the tradition of the Prussian army, systematically acted since the time of Queen Elisabeth’s government to prevent by all means, and if necessary also by force, a European power from overstepping the general framework of other nations. The means of force that England usually employed in such cases varied according to the situation and the proposed task, while its determination and integrity always remained unchanged. After the political independence of its colonial dominions in North America, England redoubled its efforts to consolidate the guarantee of its
Security in Europe. Thus, after the annihilation of Spain and the Netherlands as maritime powers, the English state concentrated all its energies against France, which was eager for supremacy, until, with the fall of Napoleon I, the danger of the hegemony of this military power, so fearsome to England, could be considered eliminated.
The change of direction in English policy against Germany took place gradually, due, on the one hand, to the fact that, in the absence of German national unity, there was no obvious danger to England, and on the other, to the fact that the public opinion of a country, conveniently influenced towards a specific purpose, can only adapt itself little by little to the ends of a new policy.
The outcome of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 had already defined England’s position. Germany simply failed to take advantage of the fluctuations that Britain’s orientation suffered on several occasions due to the growing economic importance of the United States and the development of Russian power in Europe; and thus, the primitive tendency of British policy became increasingly entrenched.
England saw Germany as a power whose commercial significance, and with it its position in world politics—due primarily to its enormous industrialization—had increased to such an extent that the political and commercial power of both nations could now be equalized. The “peaceful-economic” conquest of the world, considered by our leaders to be the last word of supreme wisdom, was, for English policy, the starting point of organized resistance. The fact that this resistance manifested itself in the form of broad and systematic action fully corresponded to a policy whose purpose was not the maintenance of a dubious world peace, but rather the consolidation of British hegemony in the world. It also reflected its traditional prudence in assessing the adversary’s capabilities and the fair calculation of its own momentary impotence that England sought the support of all states that, from a military point of view, might be convenient to its policy. But this conduct cannot be described as “unscrupulous,” since the vast preparation required for a war is not judged by contemplative aspects, but by utilitarian ones. The work of a nation’s diplomacy is to ensure that it does not succumb through mere heroism, but is practically preserved. Every means that leads to this end must be appropriate, and not employing them is a sign of
should be considered a criminal failure to perform one’s duty.
The German revolution of 1918 was, for English politics, the outlet for the concern that the threat of Germanic hegemony in the world had created against the tranquility of Great Britain.
From that moment on, England no longer had any interest in Germany disappearing from the map of Europe; on the contrary, the tremendous German disaster of those days in November 1918 placed English diplomacy facing a new and unexpected situation: Germany defeated and France elevated to the rank of Europe’s leading continental power!
The annihilation of German power could only benefit England’s enemies. However, from November 1918 to the summer of 1919, a new shift in English policy, which had so often tested the fanaticism and energies of the great mass of its people during the long war, was no longer possible. France had assumed the right to act and could impose its will. The only nation that, in those months of negotiations and bargaining, could have brought about a change in this state of affairs was Germany itself, which was suffering the convulsions of civil war and, through the mouths of its pseudo-statesmen, proclaimed a thousand times that it was ready to accept any dictate.
The only possible course of action left to England, as a means of preventing French power from growing too large, was to participate in France’s rapacity.
In reality, England did not achieve the goal it had sought with the war; not only did it fail to put an end to the preponderance of one European power over the others on the continent, but it actually fostered it to a superlative degree.
Today’s France is, as a military power, the first on the continent and has no serious rivals. To the south, its borders with Spain and Italy are practically impassable; toward Germany, they are guaranteed by the impotence of our homeland; and finally, its coasts extend widely across the vital nerves of the British Empire. Aside from the fact that these centers of English life are easy targets for long-range aircraft and artillery, the great routes of English trade are at the mercy of submarine warfare.
England’s perpetual desire is to maintain a certain balance of power among European states, as a primary condition for British hegemony in the world.
France’s perpetual desire is none other than to prevent the formation of a homogeneous German power; to maintain in Germany a system of small states with countervailing forces, not subject to a central government; and, ultimately, to seize control of the left bank of the Rhine as a means of creating and securing its supremacy in Europe.
The highest aspiration of French diplomacy will eternally be contrary to the highest tendency of British politics.
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There is no statesman who, being English, American, or Italian, would ever have thought of being “pro” German. Every Englishman, as a statesman, will naturally be English first and foremost; the American, an American, and we will not find an Italian willing to pursue any policy other than pro-Italianism. Therefore, anyone who believes that alliances with foreign nations can be cemented solely on the basis of the sympathy their rulers have for Germany is either an ass or insincere. The skill of a leading statesman is revealed precisely in the fact that he always finds, to meet the needs of his country at a given moment, those allies who, while also looking after their own interests, must follow the same path.
Which states, then, currently lack a vital interest in France’s military-economic power reaching a state of absolute hegemony, as a result of the complete annihilation of a German Central Europe? And which states, due to the conditions inherent to their very existence and following the traditional orientation of their policy, see in the development of such a situation a threat to their future?
Of course, it is important to clearly define one fact: The key to French foreign policy will always lie in the goal of seizing the Rhine border and consolidating France’s control of this river at the price of leaving Germany in ruins.
If England does not admit Germany as a world power, France, on the other hand, does not tolerate any power called Germany. What an essential difference! We are not fighting today for a position of world power; we are fighting simply for the existence of our homeland, for the unity of our nation, and for daily bread for our children. If, starting from this point of view, we try to find allies in Europe, only two states should be taken into account: England and Italy.
England does not want a France whose military fist, unencumbered by any obstacle in Europe, would act as the arbiter of a policy that, for one reason or another, would have to clash with English interests. It is understandable that England would never want France, by taking over the vast iron and coal mines of Western Europe, to acquire the basic elements for a position of economic dominance in the world.
Neither can nor will Italy view with sympathy the consolidation of French supremacy in Europe. Italy’s future will always depend on a political development that territorially revolves around Mediterranean interests. Italy’s entry into the war was not in any way motivated by the desire to contribute to the aggrandizement of France, but solely by the intention of dealing a mortal blow to Austria—its hated rival in the Adriatic.
Any further consolidation of French power on the continent represents an obstacle for Italy’s future; and let us not forget that among nations, racial affinities cannot erase trivialities.
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But could it be in the interest of other states to ally themselves with today’s Germany?
Surely not! A power that cares about its reputation and expects more from an alliance than mere cash commissions for greedy parliamentarians will not, and could not, make a pact with today’s Germany. Ultimately, our current inability to form an alliance lies at the root of the solidarity that unites our rapacious enemies.
Another fact of fundamental importance for the formation of European alliances deserves even greater attention: If we consider the problem from a purely British political point of view, the
The greater the interest of England in the growing annihilation of Germany, the greater, in turn, is the expectation placed on such a development by the international Jewry of the Stock Exchange. The contradiction between the official, or rather traditional, policy of Great Britain and the tendency embodied by the predominant Jewish forces on the Stock Exchange finds its clearest expression in the divergent attitude of both toward foreign policy problems. Contrary to the interests of the British State, Jewish finance desires not only the total economic destruction of Germany, but also its complete political enslavement.
Thus, the Jew has now become the greatest instigator of German devastation. Everything we read against Germany anywhere in the world comes from a Jewish inspiration, just as before and during the war, it was the Jewish press of the Stock Exchange and Marxism that systematically fomented hatred against us until state after state abandoned neutrality and, sacrificing the true interests of the people, placed themselves at the service of the global war coalition forged against Germany.
The rationale for the Jewish approach is obvious. The Bolshevisation of Germany, that is, the extermination of the national-racist thinking class, thereby achieving the possibility of subjecting the sources of German production to the international yoke of Jewish finance, is nothing more than the prelude to the spread of the Jewish tendency toward world conquest. As so often in history, Germany constitutes, in this case, the focal point of a gigantic struggle. If our people and our state succumb under the pressure of these tyrants, eager for blood and money, the entire world will fall prey to their octopus tentacles; moreover, if Germany manages to free itself from this grip, it can be said that one of the greatest dangers for the entire world has been abolished.
Generally speaking, Judaism, embedded in the national organism of different peoples, always knows how to employ those weapons that, taking into account the mentality of the respective nations, seem to be the most effective and the most promising. In Germany, it is more or less “cosmopolitan” or pacifist ideas—in a word, international tendencies—that the Jew uses in his struggle for power; in France, he exploits chauvinism with well-calculated calculation; in England, he operates from economic and world-political perspectives.
In France alone, there exists, today more than ever, a close coexistence between the aims of the Jewish-run Bourse and the aspirations of a national-chauvinist policy. And it is precisely this identity that poses an immense danger to Germany, making France our most fearsome enemy. The French people, who are increasingly falling prey to Negroid bastardization, pose, due to their connection with the aims of Jewish world domination, an imminent threat to the white race in Europe. The contamination of the Rhine with black blood, in the very heart of Europe, responds to the sadistic thirst for revenge of the French chauvinist, a secular enemy of our people, and no less to the cold calculation of the Jew who, in this way, sought to initiate the bastardization of the European continent in its central core and, by infesting the white race with an inferior humanity, deprive it of the foundations of its sovereign existence.
What France is committing today in Europe, spurred on by its thirst for revenge and systematically guided by the Jew, constitutes a sin against the existence of white humanity, and one day the curse of an entire generation will fall upon this people, one that will have recognized, in the dishonor of the race, the original sin of humanity.
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It is only natural that even for us National Socialists, it would be difficult within our own ranks to proclaim England as a possible future ally of Germany. The Jewish press in our country always knew how to concentrate animosity toward England, and more than one naive German fell for the Jewish trick. The chatter of this press revolved around a supposed resurgence of our maritime power, protested against the theft of our colonies, and did not fail to recommend the need to reconquer them. In all this, it did nothing more than supply the material that the scoundrel Jew then took it upon himself to send to his cronies in England, for practical use in their Germanophobic propaganda. That today we are not in a position to fight for maritime power or similar things is a persuasion that must already be infiltrating the empty heads of our bourgeois politicians. To direct the nation’s forces in this direction without first securing our position in Europe,
It was, even before the war, considered madness. Today, such an idea is considered one of those blunders that, politically considered, deserve to be described as a crime.
How many times will we reach the limits of despair, seeing how the Jewish instigators knew how to entertain our people with motives that are now completely secondary, promoting demonstrations and protests while, in those same days, France tore the German structure apart piece by piece, systematically stripping us of the foundations of our autonomy.
Here I must particularly mention one topic that the Jew knew how to use in those years with extraordinary skill: the question of South Tyrol.
Yes, the Tyrol question!
I would like to emphasize that I, personally, count myself among those who, from August 1914 to November 1918—when the fate of Germany and, with it, the fate of South Tyrol was being decided—served where the defense of this territory actually took place: in the army. I, too, had fought in those years, not so that this territory would become ours, like the others on German soil.
There can be no doubt that the reintegration of lost territories is not achieved by the sole virtue of solemn invocations to the Almighty or by pious hopes in the justice of a league of nations, but solely by arms.
If Germany wants to end the danger of extermination that threatens it in Europe, it must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the pre-war period and become an enemy of the entire world.
It was the fantastic conception of a Nibelungen-like alliance with the slumping Habsburg state that plunged Germany into ruin. Giving in to sentimentality, in the face of the possibilities of our current foreign policy, will be the best way to permanently prevent a German resurgence.
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No one will claim that the disgrace of the times we live in is a typical expression of the character of our people. What we see today around us
ours and what we experience intimately, is nothing more than the horrifying result of the devastating influence of the perjury committed on November 9, 1918. Even in these times, the good fundamental elements of our people have not completely disappeared: they only lie inert at the bottom. More than once, they appeared like lightning in the dark firmament, luminous virtues that the Germany of the future will one day remember as the first telltale signs of an incipient recovery.
When we lament the current state of our country, we must ask ourselves: What did our leaders do to revive in this people the spirit of national pride, manly integrity, and sacred hatred?
When the Treaty of Versailles was imposed on the German nation in 1919, it might have been right to expect that this very instrument of limitless oppression would profoundly stimulate Germany’s cry for freedom. Peace treaties, whose impositions scourge peoples, are not infrequently the first drumbeat announcing a future uprising.
What enormous profit could have been derived from the Treaty of Versailles! In the hands of a government ready for action, this instrument of unprecedented exaction and the most shameful humiliation could have been transformed into a means of stirring national sentiments to the utmost degree. How each point of that treaty could have been imprinted on the minds and souls of our people until the sentiment of common opprobrium and hatred exploded in the consciences of sixty million men and women in a single immense flame, so that, then, from its embers, a single will arose, hard as steel, and with it the cry: “We want weapons again!”
Everything was omitted and nothing was done. Who should be surprised now that our people are not what they should have been or what they could have been? If the rest of the world sees in us nothing more than the bailiff, the submissive dog who licks in recognition the hands that just whipped him?
Surely the possibility of seeking an alliance with Germany at present is seriously compromised by the mistakes of our own people, but even more so by the fault of our governments.
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The general anti-German psychosis, sown and fostered by war propaganda in other countries, will logically persist as long as the Reich does not recover, through an evident resurgence of the spirit of national conservation, the characteristics of a State capable of playing its role on the board of European politics and being worthy of consideration.
A nation in a situation analogous to ours will be considered a possible ally only when its government and public opinion fanatically proclaim and sustain the will to embark on its libertarian crusade. This, then, is the condition that must first be met to bring about a favorable change in public opinion in other states.
But there is another aspect to consider: Changing a certain criterion, deeply rooted in a people, represents in itself a difficult task, and many will fail to understand the new objective at first. Hence, it is both a crime and an absurdity to provide, with our own errors, these adverse elements with weapons for their counteraction. For no one who reflects calmly can deny that the uproar tending toward the acquisition of a new fleet, the restitution of our colonies, etc., is really nothing more than silly nonsense without any practical value. Furthermore, the way in which these reckless outbreaks of systematic protesters are politically exploited in England, sometimes harmless, sometimes exorbitant, but always indirectly in the service of those who are our irreducible enemies, cannot be described as favorable to Germany.
Here too, nationalism has a mission to fulfill: to teach our people to put aside secondary issues and focus only on what is most important, without forgetting that the objective for which we must fight today is the existence of this people of ours, and that the only enemy we must mortally wound is and will be the one who takes away from us the right to that existence.
However severe the blows received, they cannot constitute sufficient reason to evade reason and, in senseless resentment, complain against the entire world, instead of confronting the most dangerous enemy with concentrated forces.
Apart from this, the German people have no moral right to condemn the conduct of the world adverse to Germany, as long as there is no
putting in the dock those criminal Germans who sold out and betrayed their own homeland.
Would it be imaginable that the representatives of the true interests of those nations that are in a position to form an alliance with Germany would succeed in imposing their views over the will of the Jew, who is the mortal enemy of national and autonomous states?
The war that FASCIST ITALY is waging, perhaps unconsciously (though I don’t think so), against the three principal weapons of Judaism is the best proof of how—even if only by indirect means—the poisonous teeth of that power that extends beyond the States must be broken. The prohibition of secret Masonic societies, the persecution carried out against the country’s internationalized press, as well as the progressive destruction of Marxism, in the face of the growing consolidation of the fascist conception of the State, will, over the years, enable the Italian government to devote itself more and more to the interests of its own people, without being influenced by the hissing of the universal Judaic hydra.
The problem is more difficult in England. In this country of “liberal democracy” par excellence, the Jew exercises an almost absolute dictatorship, using public opinion as his weapon. But the constant struggle there between the representatives of the interests of the British state and the defenders of the international dictatorship of Jewry is no less evident. The violence with which these two currents often clash could be clearly observed, for the first time after the war, in the divergent attitudes adopted by the government and the press in England regarding the Japanese problem.
Once the World War was over, the mutual quarrel between the United States and Japan began to intensify, and it was only natural that the great European powers would not remain indifferent to the imminent danger of a new conflict. The ties of racial affinity are no obstacle to England’s continued view of the growth of the international power of the North American Union in all areas of economic and political activity with a certain degree of sentiment—a mixture of fear and envy. It seems that the former colony—daughter of the great metropolis—is on the way to becoming a new sovereign of the world. It is understandable, then, that England today, full of doubt, is reviewing its former alliance pacts and
begin to glimpse with anxiety the climactic moment when it will no longer be said: “Great Britain, queen of the seas” but “The seas of the Union.”
England therefore anxiously resorts to the aid of the yellow fist.
While the English government – ​​despite the fact that Great Britain and America formed a common front on the European battlefields – was unwilling to accommodate its ties with its ally from across Asia, the entire Jewish press perfidiously attacked that pact.
In today’s European states, Jews see nothing but instruments of their own to subjugate, whether through the indirect means of so-called Western democracy or, directly, through the domination of Russian Bolshevism. But not only has the old world fallen into the clutches of the Jews, but the new world also faces the same fate: Jews are the arbiters of the United States’ economic potential.
The Jew knows only too well that, thanks to his age-old adaptation, he can undermine European peoples and bastardize them, but he understands, at the same time, that he would never subject an Asian nation-state of the Japanese kind to the same fate. He pretends to be German, English, American, French, but to become Asian yellow, he would have to bridge a chasm. And this is why, availing himself of the support of other states of a similar constitution, he attempts to break the bloc of the Japanese nation-state to rid himself of such a dangerous adversary.
As in the past against Germany, it is now instigating the people against Japan, and it will not be surprising if, when the time comes, while British diplomacy still believes it can rely on the Japanese alliance, the Jewish press in England will demand, for its part, to break lances with the ally and prepare a war of devastation against it under the pretext of democracy and with the battle cry: Down with Japanese militarism and imperialism!
The Jew in England has thus become insubordinate. Consequently, the fight against the global danger to Jewry will also begin there!
The National Socialist movement in Germany must ensure that, at least in our own country, the mortal enemy is defined and that the struggle against it also serves as a bright guide for other peoples toward a brighter future for Aryan humanity.
