CHAPTERÂ TEN The Mask of Federalism
In the winter of 1919, and even more so in the spring and summer of 1920, the young National Socialist Party was forced to define its position on a problem that, during the war, would have assumed extraordinary importance. In the brief description contained in the first part of this book of the symptoms I was able to personally witness of the impending German disaster, I referred to the special nature of the propaganda wielded by both the French and the English to foment the age-old quarrel between North and South Germany. In the spring of 1915, the first agitational leaflets against Prussia appeared systematically on the German front, pointing to that country as the sole culprit for the war.
In 1916 this campaign reached a level of consummate development that was both skillful and villainous.
The agitation carried out by the South Germans against those of the North, which was calculated to stimulate the basest instincts, soon began to bear fruit.
It is necessary to level a reproach at the authorities responsible at that time, both in the government and in the army—but above all in the Bavarian command—that they cannot avoid: and that is that, in criminal neglect of their duty, they did not act with the necessary fortitude in the face of such a campaign. Nothing was done! On the contrary, it even seemed that in some sectors the campaign was not viewed with displeasure, thinking, with evident mental limitation, that, through this fatal influence, not only was a barrier to the development of German unity opposed, but that with it, an automatic intensification of the federalist tendency was also produced. Rarely does one find in history a case of deliberate neglect with more serious effects! The weakening that was believed to be inflicted on Prussia affected all of Germany and its consequence was to precipitate the disaster, which meant not only the ruin of the entire national
Germany, but also that of each of the German states in particular.
Munich, the city where the artificially aroused hatred toward Prussia burned most violently, must have been the first to launch the revolutionary cry against its traditional monarchy.
But it would be a mistake to attribute the origin of this hostile spirit toward Prussia exclusively to enemy war propaganda. The incredibly senseless way in which our war economy was organized, which, with a centralization bordering on the absurd, held the entire territory of the Reich under its control and exploited it, was one of the principal causes that engendered this anti-Prussian sentiment; for, in the common people’s view, the supply committees, which had their headquarters in Berlin, were identified with the capital, and, in turn, Berlin with Prussia.
The Jew was too malicious not to have realized, even then, that the infamous campaign of exploitation he himself had organized against the German people, under the guise of the supply committees, would and must provoke resistance. As long as this resistance did not pose a danger to him, he had no reason to fear it; but in order to prevent an explosion of the masses driven by despair and indignation, he discovered that there could be no better recipe than to divert popular fury in another direction, as a means of neutralizing it.
Then came the revolution!
The international Jew, Kurt Eisner, began intriguing in Bavaria against Prussia. By giving the Bavarian revolutionary movement a deliberately hostile character toward the rest of Germany, he did not in the least act with the intention of serving Bavarian interests, but simply as an enforcer of Judaism. He exploited the instincts and antipathies of the Bavarian people in order to more easily bring Germany to its knees. But soon the ruined Reich would fall into the hands of Bolshevism.
The skill with which the Bolshevik agitators were able to present the abolition of the Soldiers’ Council Republic as a victory of “Prussian militarism” over the “anti-militarist and anti-Prussian” Bavarian people produced excellent results. When the elections for the Bavarian Constituent Diet were held in Munich, Kurt Eisner had barely ten thousand supporters and the Communist Party had barely three thousand, while when the communist republic collapsed, the
The number of both groups had already reached a total of approximately one hundred thousand.
From that time on, I became personally involved in the struggle against the uncontrolled unrest among the German states. In my entire life, I don’t believe I have ever undertaken a more popular work than my campaign of resistance against the existing animosity toward Prussia.
During the reign of the Soldiers’ Council, the first rallies took place in Munich where hatred against the rest of Germany, especially against Prussia, was stirred up to such an extent that not only was it life-threatening for any North German who dared to attend such a rallies, but these demonstrations almost always ended with the stupid chants of “Down with Prussia!” and “Let’s secede from Prussia!”
“War on Prussia!”, etc., a state of mind that found its full expression in the war cry of an “unsurpassable” representative of the highest interests of Bavaria in the Reichstag, who said: We prefer to die as Bavarians rather than perish as Prussians.
The campaign I had initiated, initially supported only by a few of my war comrades, was later fostered by the young National Socialist movement as a sacred duty. Even today, I am proud to say that, in those days—relying almost exclusively on our Bavarian coreligionists—we slowly but surely put an end to that separatist movement, a mixture of ignorance and betrayal.
It would be obvious to explain that the stirring of anti-Prussian sentiment had nothing to do with German federalism. Of course, the fact of a “federalist activity” bent on dissolving or disintegrating an already existing German federal state was surprising. A sincere federalist, for whom the Bismarckian conception of a united Reich was not a false phrase, could hardly desire the disintegration of the Prussian state, created and perfected by Bismarck himself, much less openly encourage separatist aspirations. It was not against the authors of the Weimar Constitution—who, incidentally, were mostly South Germans and Jews—that the insults and attacks of these pseudo-federalists were directed; their action was directed against the representative elements of the old conservative Prussia, that is, precisely against the antagonistic spirit of Weimar. The fact that at that time
If the campaign were careful not to allude to the Jews, it should not surprise us too much, but it will give us the key to the enigma.
Just as before the 1918 revolution, the Jew knew how to divert public attention from his supply committees, or rather from himself, by inveighing against Prussia among the masses, and particularly among the Bavarian people, so after the revolution he had to cover up by any means necessary the loot from his plunder, which was now ten times greater. And once again he won his game, this time by sowing discord and hatred among the nationalist elements of Germany; thus he intrigued the conservative-leaning Bavarians against the no less conservative Prussians. The Bavarian saw not the Berlin of its four million active and tireless inhabitants, but that lazy and corrupt one, with the most detestable neighborhoods of the West. But his hatred was not directed at that unhealthy world; his target was the “Prussian” city! That was truly desperate!
Slowly, a change in this state of affairs began. It is evident that as early as the winter of 1918-19, a collective feeling that could be interpreted as antisemitism began to make itself felt.
Later, thanks to the impetus of the National Socialist movement, the Jewish problem was actively addressed, first and foremost because, by removing this problem from the limited sphere of bourgeois circles, it was possible to make it the driving force of a great popular movement. But as soon as this became possible, the Jews began to organize their defense. They again resorted to their old tactics. With astonishing speed, they ignited the spark of discord right within the movement and thus sowed the seeds of disunity. The only way to occupy public attention with other problems and halt the concentrated attack on Jewry lay—given the prevailing situation—to raise the issue of Ultramontanism and thus provoke the usual struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism. Those who stirred up this issue among the German people will never be able to repair the damage caused. In any case, the Jew achieved his desired objective: Catholics and Protestants had entered into a fierce controversy, and the mortal enemy of the Aryan world and of all Christianity was laughing in their faces.
Consider how disastrous are the daily consequences of the Jewish bastardization of our people, and also reflect that this poisoning of our blood can only be eliminated from the national organism after centuries – or perhaps never.
Our fellow citizens pass by like blind people in the face of the systematic poisoning of our race by the Jews. And the two Christian churches—the Catholic and the Protestant—both show themselves indifferent to this profanation and destruction. For the future of humanity, the importance of the problem lies not in the triumph of Protestants over Catholics, or of Catholics over Protestants, but in knowing whether the Aryan race will persist or disappear.
The situation of the Church in Germany does not permit any comparison with France, Spain, or Italy. In all these countries, for example, the fight against clericalism or ultramontanism can be spread without running the risk of such an endeavor resulting in a dissociation within the French, Spanish, or Italian people. Such a thing would be impossible in Germany, because Protestants would surely soon interfere in the struggle. Criticism that in other countries would be sustained exclusively by Catholics in the face of political interference by dignitaries of their own Church would in fact take on the character of an attack by Protestantism against Catholicism in Germany. This explains why all criticism, even unjust, could be tolerated as long as it came from one’s own parishioners, while it was flatly rejected when it came from another religious sector.
Those who, in 1924, believed that the fight against “ultramontanism” constituted the supreme task of the National-Racist movement have not destroyed Ultramontanism, but they have broken the unity of the National-Racist cause. I must also refuse to admit that within the ranks of our movement there is any genius that claims to be able to accomplish what Bismarck himself could not. It will always be the highest duty of the leaders of National Socialism to vigorously combat any attempt to place the National-Socialist movement at the service of those struggles and to immediately remove propagandists of similar aims from our ranks. The most fervent Protestant can align himself with the most fervent Catholic, without ever having to worry about his religious convictions. On the contrary, the gigantic common struggle they waged against the destroyer of the Aryan world has taught them mutual respect and esteem. And it was precisely in those years that the movement carried out a tenacious opposition against the Center Party (Catholic Party), not for religious reasons, but exclusively for reasons of a national, racial and economic nature.
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The struggle between federalism and unitarianism, which the Jews so cleverly managed to stir up in the years 1919 to 1921, forced the National Socialist movement, even though it was opposed to this struggle, to also define its position on the essential questions arising from this controversy.
Should Germany be a federal or unitary state? In my opinion, the latter seems more important.
What is a federal state?
By a federal state, we understand an association of sovereign countries which, by virtue of their own sovereignty, voluntarily merge, each of them renouncing in favor of the whole, that part of their own prerogatives capable of making possible and guaranteeing the existence of the constituted federation.
This theoretical formula has no absolute practical application in any of the world’s federal states, and even less so in the United States of North America. It was not the states that constituted the American Federal Union, but rather the latter that previously shaped a large portion of those so-called states. The broad exclusive rights conferred, or rather, recognized, to the various American territories not only corresponded to the nature of this confederation of countries, but were, above all, related to the magnitude of its dominions and the extent of the territorial surface of the whole, which is almost that of a continent. Therefore, in the case of the American Union, one cannot speak of the political sovereignty of the states, but only of their rights, or rather, their privileges, determined and constitutionally guaranteed.
In the case of Germany, the given definition does not apply exactly either, and this despite the undeniable fact that the respective countries previously existed in isolation, constituted as sovereign states, from which the German Reich was born. However, the formation of the Reich was not due to the free will or cooperation of these states, but to the influence of the hegemony of only one of them: Prussia. Of course, the very great territorial differences between the various German states do not allow a parallel to be drawn, e.g., with the
American federal institution. This territorial difference between the smaller states of yesteryear and the larger ones, or rather, the largest of all, demonstrates the inequality of capacities and, on the other hand, the lack of uniformity in the contribution of each to the founding of the Reich, that is, to the constitution of the federal state.
The respective states’ surrender of their sovereign rights in favor of the creation of the Reich was only minimally spontaneous; moreover, such rights practically did not exist, or if they did, they were simply annexed under pressure from Prussian power. It is true that, in this regard, Bismarck did not proceed from the principle of giving the Reich everything that could have been conveniently taken from the various states, but rather demanded from them only what was indispensable to the Reich. This was, of course, a criterion that was both moderate and wise: on the one hand, he regarded customs and traditions with the utmost respect, and on the other, he thus won for the new Reich a greater contingent of affection and enthusiastic collaboration from each of the confederate states. But it would be fundamentally erroneous to try to attribute this action of Bismarck’s to his conviction that, with what he had done, the Reich would, for all time, be in possession of a sufficient sum of sovereign rights.
Bismarck, on the other hand, had no such conviction. His purpose was none other than to leave for the future what, for the moment, was difficult to achieve and manage. Indeed, over time, the sovereignty of the Reich grew at the expense of the sovereignty of the Confederate States. Time vindicated Bismarck’s foresight.
The German disaster of 1918 and the destruction of the monarchical state precipitated this development. If the elimination of the monarchical regime and its representatives had dealt a severe blow to the federal character of the Reich, the effect must have been even greater when Germany accepted the obligations resulting from the Versailles “peace” treaty.
It was natural and logical that the Confederate States should lose all sovereignty over the control of their finances, since the Reich was imposed, as a consequence of the lost war, a financial obligation that could never have been met by partial contributions from the States. The subsequent measures leading to the centralization of postal and railway services were
inevitable consequences of the enslavement of our people, gradually initiated by the peace treaties.
Bismarck’s Reich was free and exempt from external obligations. It was not burdened by such heavy and at the same time unproductive financial burdens as the Dawes Plan is for Germany today. Its domestic responsibilities were limited to a few absolutely necessary aspects. It is natural that it was thus possible to forgo maintaining its own financial administration and live off the contributions of the Confederate States; and it is natural that the fact that the States continued to exercise the sovereign right to manage their own revenues admirably confirmed the States’ sense of loyalty to the Reich, apart from the fact that their contributions to the Reich were relatively small.
The post-war German state is therefore now forced, in order to survive, to increasingly curtail the privileges of the respective Reich countries, not only for material reasons but also for ideal ones. By demanding every last tribute from its subjects as a consequence of its exacting financial policy, this state must necessarily deprive them of even the most basic rights, if it does not want general discontent to one day lead to the outbreak of rebellion.
In response to the aforementioned state of affairs, we National Socialists have a fundamental rule to observe: A vigorous, national Reich that, in its foreign policy, looks after and protects the interests of its subjects in the broadest sense can offer internal freedom without risking the stability of the state. But under other circumstances, a strong national government can also considerably restrict individual freedoms, as in the confederate countries, without detriment to the idea of ​​the Reich, and provided that citizens recognize in these measures a means toward national greatness.
It is indisputable that all states in the world tend toward a certain administrative centralization in their internal organization, and Germany will be no exception to the rule. The particular importance of each of the countries that form a confederation is increasingly diminishing, both in the area of ​​communications and in the administrative order. Modern traffic and technology are daily reducing distances and
extensions. Anyone who avoids the consequences of faits accomplis will therefore be a laggard.
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While a certain degree of centralization seems natural, especially in communications services, we National Socialists consider it no less natural to take a firm stand against such a development in the current state, when the relevant measures pursue no other objective than to justify and facilitate a disastrous foreign policy. Precisely because the current Reich has proceeded with the so-called nationalization of the railways, post office, finance, etc., not out of reasons of profound national interest, but solely for the purpose of having in its hands the resources and guarantees necessary to fulfill its policy of condescension toward the Allies, we National Socialists must do everything in our power to hinder, and if possible, prevent, the implementation of such a policy.
But by acting in this way, our standard will always be one of noble national policy and never of petty and particularistic tendencies.
This consideration is indispensable to prevent the belief from arising among our coreligionists that we National Socialists are trying to deny the Reich the right to embody a sovereignty greater than that of the states that comprise it. Regarding this right, there cannot and should not be any doubt among us, since, from the moment that the State itself means to us nothing more than a form, the essential thing being its content, that is, the nation, the people, it goes without saying that everything else must necessarily be subordinated to the sovereign interests of the nation. Above all, within the national whole represented by the Reich, we cannot tolerate political autonomy or the exercise of sovereignty by any of the states in particular. One day, the folly of the Confederate States maintaining their so-called diplomatic representations abroad and among themselves must and will end.
As long as such anomalies persist, there is no reason to be surprised that foreigners constantly question the stability of the Reich and act accordingly.
In any case, the importance of the various countries of the Reich will in the future primarily revolve around the field of cultural activity. The monarch who did the most for Bavaria’s prestige was not a stubborn particularist, opposed to national unity, but a man who, along with his love for art, aspired to the great German homeland – King Ludwig I.
Above all, care will be taken to protect the army from regionalist influences. The future National Socialist State must not fall into the past error of assigning to the armed forces a role that neither belongs nor can be its proper function.
The German army is not in the Reich to serve as a school for the preservation of regional peculiarities, but rather to form an institution where all Germans learn to understand each other and adapt to one another. Everything in national life that might signify antagonism must be smoothed out by the army, acting as a unifying factor. It must also remove the young conscript from the narrow horizon of his bell tower and place him in the atmosphere of the nation. It will not be the borders of his homeland that he sees; but those of the fatherland, for these are what he will one day have to defend. Therefore, it is inappropriate to leave him in his own country instead of introducing him to other parts of Germany during his military service.
National Socialist doctrine is not meant to serve the political interests of certain states in isolation within the Reich confederation, but rather aspires to one day become the sovereign of the entire nation. It will have to reorganize and guide the life of a people and, therefore, imperatively assume the right to cross borders established by a political development we condemn.
